'Linkage' pharmaceutical evergreening in Canada and Australia by Lexchin, Joel & Faunce, Thomas
BioMed Central
Australia and New Zealand Health 
Policy
ssOpen AcceDebate
'Linkage' pharmaceutical evergreening in Canada and Australia
Thomas A Faunce*1 and Joel Lexchin2
Address: 1College of Law and Medical School, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia and 2School of Health Policy and Management, 
York University, Toronto, Canada
Email: Thomas A Faunce* - Thomas.Faunce@anu.edu.au; Joel Lexchin - joel.lexchin@utoronto.ca
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
'Evergreening' is not a formal concept of patent law. It is best understood as a social idea used to
refer to the myriad ways in which pharmaceutical patent owners utilise the law and related
regulatory processes to extend their high rent-earning intellectual monopoly privileges, particularly
over highly profitable (either in total sales volume or price per unit) 'blockbuster' drugs. Thus, while
the courts are an instrument frequently used by pharmaceutical brand name manufacturers to
prolong their patent royalties, 'evergreening' is rarely mentioned explicitly by judges in patent
protection cases. The term usually refers to threats made to competitors about a brand-name
manufacturer's tactical use of pharmaceutical patents (including over uses, delivery systems and
even packaging), not to extension of any particular patent over an active product ingredient. This
article focuses in particular on the 'evergreening' potential of so-called 'linkage' provisions, imposed
on the regulatory (safety, quality and efficacy) approval systems for generic pharmaceuticals of
Canada and Australia, by specific articles in trade agreements with the US. These 'linkage'
provisions have also recently appeared in the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUSFTA).
They require such drug regulators to facilitate notification of, or even prevent, any potential patent
infringement by a generic pharmaceutical manufacturer. This article explores the regulatory lessons
to be learnt from Canada's and Australia's shared experience in terms of minimizing potential
adverse impacts of such 'linkage evergreening' provisions on drug costs and thereby potentially on
citizen's access to affordable, essential medicines.
'Linkage' Evergreening – Evolution from Hatch-
Waxman to NAFTA
The 'linkage' form of patent 'evergreening' is an important
strategy that multinational pharmaceutical companies
have been using in the United States since the passage of
the Waxman-Hatch legislation in 1984, to prolong rent-
profits over 'blockbuster' (high total revenue) drugs. This
legislation was originally designed to facilitate easier mar-
ket entry for generic pharmaceuticals, in return for extend-
ing the patent term of brand name competitors as a partial
compensation for delayed regulatory (safety, efficacy and
quality) approvals. Quicker generic availability was per-
ceived as profit-threatening by the brand-name pharma-
ceutical industry, chiefly because low cost, quality
generics rapidly captured the bulk of market share after
blockbuster patent expiry [1]. The legislation's promised
grand compromise between access and innovation, how-
ever, failed to materialize, as provisions favorable to
brand name manufacturers were progressively empha-
sized [2].
In 2002, an extensive and lengthy inquiry by the US Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC), found that the Waxman-
Hatch legislation had resulted in as many as 75% of new
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encing legal actions under patent laws by the original
brand name patent owner. These were driving up US drug
costs by keeping the cheaper generic versions off the mar-
ket. The FTC recommended that only one 'evergreening'
injunction against a potential generic market entrant be
permitted per product [3]. This complex 'anti-evergreen-
ing' legislative change (along with a process for expedited
challenge) was implemented December 2003 under the
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernisation
Act 2003 (US). That legislation also implemented, how-
ever (after considerable industry lobbying) in the so-
called Medicare Part D benefit, a fiscally expensive (add-
ing $14 billion to Medicare costs by 2013) drug benefit
subsidy (with no readily apparent upper limit of total
expenditure) for those aged 65 and older, whilst prevent-
ing the Federal US Medicare agency from negotiating drug
prices with drug companies on behalf of the multiple pri-
vate Medicare Advantage drug plans which operate under
Medicare Part D [4].
In 1993, under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)-induced Canadian Notice Of Compliance (NOC)
'linkage' regulations, drug safety, quality and efficacy reg-
ulators at Health Canada were prevented from issuing an
authorization for market entry, until the all of the relevant
patents on a brand name product had been proven to
have expired. As a result, when a Canadian generic com-
pany (such as Apotex) submits its application to get a
product approved, it also sends a Notice of Allegation
(NOA) to the patent holder claiming that no patents are
being infringed. The patent holder then has 45 days in
which to initiate an application in the Federal Court of
Canada, seeking an order to prohibit the relevant Minister
from issuing a Notice of Compliance to the generic man-
ufacturer for a period of 24 months, or upon resolution of
the court application, whichever is sooner.
The NOC 'linkage' regulations, were formulated by Indus-
try Canada and are administered by the Office of Patented
Medicines and Liaison, located in the Therapeutic Prod-
ucts Directorate, Health Products and Foods Branch,
Health Canada. They require the Minister of Health to
maintain a Patent Register [5]. This consists of patent lists
submitted in respect of eligible NOC-issued drugs. The
Minister responsible for Health Canada may refuse to
add, or may delete, information from this Patent Register.
Each patent list is audited (for example as to whether
potential inclusions are mere 'evergreening' attempts) by
the Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison. Reports
produced by that body outline statistics relating to the
maintenance of the Patent Register, including the number
of patents filed, the number of patents accepted and
rejected, and litigation resulting from the acceptance or
rejection of patents for listing on the Patent Register. They
also include statistics on the outcomes of generic drug
manufacturers filing a Form V Patent Declaration with the
Minister, and serving an NOA on the relevant patented
drug manufacturer [6].
The effect of these 'linkage' regulations has been a subject
of intense disagreement between the Canadian generic
and brand name companies. The Canadian Generic Phar-
maceutical Association (CGPA) claims that "not only is
this abuse of Canada's patent regime extremely harmful to
Canada's generic pharmaceutical industry, the Canadian
public loses out on millions of dollars in savings by hav-
ing to pay for the higher-priced brand-name version for an
extended period of time. The delays caused by these need-
less court battles have cost Canadians, their governments
and private insurers hundreds of millions of dollars." [7].
The increase in drug spending attendant on the delay in
the appearance of generic equivalents may partly explain
why provincial governments have increased co-payments
and deductibles for recipients of publicly funded drug
plans.
Canada's Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies
(Rx&D), the peak brand name industry association,
counters that these regulations are necessary because
"generics do not have to concern themselves with a possi-
ble interlocutory injunction to prevent infringing sales
once an infringing generic product is on the market. Sta-
tistics show that this remedy is available in pharmaceuti-
cal cases approximately half as often as in other industry
patent cases. Indeed, as a result of the inability of pharma-
ceutical patentees to obtain interlocutory injunctions to
prevent the complete destruction of their intellectual
property rights and market share, the 'linkage' regulations
are the only means for Canada to meet its international
obligations to provide an effective enforcement mecha-
nism for patents."[8]. In-other-words, Rx&D's claim is
that the availability of injunctions against the marketing
of a generic product is insufficient protection because
these injunctions are frequently unavailable to the brand-
name companies.
Rx&D also points out that the approximate 80% success
rate for the generic companies, translates into 4 out of 5
'anti-evergreening' cases won and presents its own figures.
The way that Rx&D calculates the judicial outcomes
appears to show a roughly equal split in wins. However,
an examination of this figure reveals that the brand name
companies are also not above playing around with num-
bers. There are 125 cases where there was no hearing, in
20 cases where the NOA was withdrawn this is counted as
a win for the patentee but the 100 cases where the innova-
tor either accepted the NOA or the case was otherwise set-
tled are not counted as wins for the generic [9].Page 2 of 11
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tiple patents to delay the appearance of a generic product.
The CGPA maintains that the brand name companies
continually list new patents on a product, each of which
can trigger a new NOA and an additional stay on the
appearance of a generic. In this way, competition is
delayed [10]. The brand name companies dispute this
interpretation. Their position is that there is always ongo-
ing research into drugs and that it is natural that new pat-
ents will be filed, reflecting improvements such as moving
from a three pill a day regimen to once a day dosing. Mul-
tiple patents on a single medicine are relatively common.
The Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison at the Ther-
apeutic Products Directorate of Health Canada estimates
that 44% of the 419 medicines on the Patent Register are
covered by more than one patent [11]. The multinationals
say that 95% of cases all subsequent patents will be issued
within 10 years of the initial patent and therefore all of the
patents may be addressed in the same linkage proceeding.
But if the effective patent life is only 10 years, as Rx&D
claims it is then new patents are being filed as old ones
expire. Even if patents are a couple of years longer then
there can still be overlapping 24 month stays depending
on when the generic company files for a NOC.
Between 1998 and 2004, out of 138 cases that have gone
to court 12% have taken more than 24 months to resolve
[12]. According to Rx&D in that situation all the generic
companies have to do is market the older version of the
product on expiry of the original patent [13]. All of this is
true but it ignores the fact that the main reason for launch-
ing a new formulation of a drug is to switch doctors to pre-
scribing that version before a generic is available to
undercut the market. This is a form of 'evergreening' that
brand name companies spend millions of advertising dol-
lars doing.
In October 2006, the Canadian federal government recog-
nized that some brand-name companies had been abus-
ing the NOC Regulations. It limited their use of
'evergreening' follow-on patents by promulgating regula-
tions that prevented any new patents they filed after a
generic company had submitted an application for
approval of its product from being considered in the NOC
Regulations process. Moreover the new regulations made
it clear that patents covering areas without direct thera-
peutic application, such as processes or intermediates,
could not be used to delay generic approval [14]. Less
than two months later the Supreme Court of Canada also
recognized that the brand-name companies had been
abusing the NOC Regulations by adding irrelevant patents
[15].
Canadian and US regulatory authorities are now being
choked by an overgrowth of additional brand name med-
icine patent 'evergreening' tactics extending far beyond
those implicit in these 'linkage' provisions. These include
miniscule modifications in delivery system or formula-
tion, combinations, licensing agreements ('authorised
generics') and 'buy-outs' of generic competitors. The US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, was
recently asked to approve the marketing of Pfizer's new
drug, called torcetrapib, which increases lipid-removing
(or HDL) cholesterol, only in combination with Pfizer's
high sales volume 'blockbuster' Lipitor (that lowers LDL
cholesterol). Lipitor, which loses its original patent pro-
tection in 2010, is the world's top-selling medicine, with
sales of almost $11 billion last year. If Pfizer's "evergreen-
ing" combination is backed by plausible research, the
FDA may have to approve it, protecting Pfizer from
actions under antitrust laws. Patients, however, who can-
not tolerate (or afford) Lipitor, will be unable to obtain
torcetrapib for use with another statin. Physicians wishing
to raise a patient's level of HDL cholesterol – but who do
not want to be forced to use Lipitor – will not have access
to torcetrapib [16]. Pfizer, in fact, later announced it
would sell torcetrapib on its own and in December 2006
halted development of torcetrapib entirely following
results of a clinical trial showing that patients who took
the drug had an increased risk of cardiovascular mortality
[17].
In summary, although 'evergreening' encompasses a wide
variety of tactics, the 'linkage' form this article concen-
trates on has evolved considerably from the Waxman-
Hatch legislation and was inserted in NAFTA. In essence it
requires that laws be enacted requiring generic manufac-
turers to notify brand name competitors of their intention
to enter the market. Such laws also require government
drug quality, safety and efficacy regulators link marketing
approval for a generic medicine with the absence of patent
claims. Having received notification of a possible market
entry by a generic product, a threatened brand-name man-
ufacturer then seeks to dissuade such competition, for
example, by claiming what are sometimes large numbers
of complex and often highly speculative patents covering
the packaging or delivery system of the drug, instead of its
active product ingredient [18]. Where a generic manufac-
turer has limited resources, such a threat of patent litiga-
tion is often enough to induce its managing directors to
remove a drug from application. Even if the generic man-
ufacturer is sufficiently funded and motivated (like Apo-
tex in Canada) to call the litigation bluff, the brand name
owner enjoys sustained sales from its blockbuster till all
patent proceedings are completed.Page 3 of 11
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Pharmaceutical 'evergreening' had received only brief
public, judicial and regulatory attention in Australia prior
to the AUSFTA. The 2002 High Court case of Aktiebolaget
Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Limited [19] was one such exam-
ple. It concerned a pharmaceutical patent owned by the
Astra Group, over an oral pharmaceutical preparation in
the form of a tablet, capsule or pellet containing omepra-
zole as the active ingredient. In 1998, as the term of the
compound patent neared its end, Alphapharm, a generic
manufacturer, commenced steps to import and sell in
Australia a pharmaceutical preparation containing ome-
prazole for therapeutic use in the treatment of gastrointes-
tinal diseases. It applied to the TGA to import and market
in Australia such a pharmaceutical preparation. In
August1998, Astra instituted a proceeding in the Federal
Court to restrain apprehended infringement of each of the
claims of the Patent and for other relief. Justice Kirby in
his judgment stated:
The strategies that large pharmaceutical manufacturers
have employed to avoid such generic competition,
which include the use of intellectual property law,
have been detailed elsewhere. They have attracted the
attention and response of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion in the United States. Such battles have had their
counterparts in many other countries. They present
serious issues for the developing world...In its inter-
pretation of the legislation, and in identifying the
proper approach to the ultimately factual determina-
tion of obviousness called for by that statute, this
Court should avoid creating fail-safe opportunities for
unwarranted extensions of monopoly protection that
are not clearly sustained by law [20].
In 2004 Arrow Pharmaceuticals Limited v Merck & Co., Inc
[21] came before Gyles J in the Federal Court involving an
application by Arrow for revocation of a number of claims
of a patent granted to Merck. In the opening paragraph of
his judgment, Giles J noted that ' [t]he case involves what
would now colloquially be called an attempt to 'ever-
green' a pharmaceutical patent'. Giles J based this inter-
pretation on the substantial evidence before the court
relating to the research and development process under-
taken at Merck and the significant input of Merck's mar-
keting department into decisions regarding research and
development [22]. The decision was appealed and the
appeal heard by the Full Court in May 2005. The majority
said little about evergreening [23].
In 2004, however, in the late stages of public and legisla-
tive debate over the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement
(AUSFTA) it became clear that one of its provisions, once
incorporated into Australian law, might facilitate the
process of pharmaceutical patent prolongation which has
become known as 'linkage evergreening.' Article 17.10.4
of the AUSFTA required that Australia's Therapeutic
Goods Administration (TGA) create a process where by a
brand name manufacturer would be informed of an
intended generic product and that marketing approval on
safety and quality grounds be "prevented" wherever a
competing product was "claimed."
Article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA provided that:
Where a Party permits, as a condition of approving the
marketing of a pharmaceutical product, persons, other
than the person originally submitting the safety or effi-
cacy information, to rely on evidence or information
concerning the safety or efficacy of a product that was
previously approved, such as evidence of prior market-
ing approval by the Party or in another territory:
(a) that Party shall provide measures in its marketing
approval process to prevent those other persons from:
(i) marketing a product, where that product is
claimed in a patent; or
(ii) marketing a product for an approved use,
where that approved use is claimed in a patent,
during the term of that patent, unless by consent or
acquiescence of the patent owner; and
(b) if the Party permits a third person to request mar-
keting approval to enter the market with:
(i) a product during the term of a patent identified
as claiming the product; or
(ii) a product for an approved use, during the term
of a patent identified as claiming that approved
use,
the Party shall provide for the patent owner to be noti-
fied of such request and the identity of any such other
person. [emphasis added]
This provision linked, for the first time in Australia, the
marketing approval regulatory process for generic phar-
maceuticals (on clinical quality, safety and efficacy
grounds), with their patent infringement status. Its formu-
lation was clearly derived from the previously discussed
Waxman-Hatch legislation introduced in the US in 1984
and the Canadian NOC Regulations implemented after
NAFTA in 1993 [24]. Article 17.10.4 (a) did not define
either "prevent" or "claimed," though an interpretation of
these terms may be gained from implementing legislation
passed by the Australian parliament as a condition ofPage 4 of 11
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17.10.4 (b) required that the patent holder be notified of
any generic marketing approval application.
Australian negotiators had stated to a federal Senate
Inquiry into the impact of the AUSFTA that their legiti-
mate expectation was that article 17.10.4 would not lead
to 'evergreening' [25]. Other commentators disagreed
[26]. They considered that the clear aim was to provide
multinational (US) pharmaceutical patent holders with a
mechanism for using the Australian judicial system to
protect the life-span of their intellectual property rent
from generic competition [27].
The Commonwealth of Australia Senate Select Committee
did find that the AUSFTA final text may not have gone as
far down the pro-pharmaceutical industry road as US
negotiators were originally pushing for. Its final report
also warmly endorsed the Australian legitimate 'anti-ever-
greening' expectations behind the TGA implementing leg-
islation and supported legislative penalties for
'evergreening' and capacity of the Commonwealth Attor-
ney General to join any action and reclaim taxpayer mon-
ies lost to 'evergreening'. The Committee's conclusion was
that ' [a]ny delay to the marketing of generic drugs as a
consequence of these changes, however slight, will have a
cost to the PBS, state governments and consumers'. It also
encouraged research to actively monitor the impact of
these changes [28].
Legislatively fulfilling the article 17.10.4 obligation, as
mentioned, was a requirement of entry into force of the
AUSFTA, and Australia had to enact consequent amend-
ments to the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth). The
amendments inserted a new section 26B which required
applicants for marketing approval to certify that their
product would not infringe a valid patent claim, or that
the patent holder has been notified of the application.
However, after vigorous public debate, the implementing
legislation went further and also introduced a new section
26C. This provides that where a certificate has been given
under s26B by a generic manufacturer and the patent
holder wishes to claim a patent and institute infringement
proceedings, he or she must first certify that the proceed-
ings are being commenced in good faith, have reasonable
prospects of success (as defined in s26C(4)) and will be
conducted without unreasonable delay. If the certificate is
found to be false or midleading, fines of up to $10 million
apply and the Cth Attorney General is permitted to join
the action to recoup losses to the PBS. Section 26D pro-
vides that a patent holder who seek an interlocutory
injunction to prevent the marketing of the generic phar-
maceutical must obtain leave from the government to do.
Sections 26C and 26D are the so-called 'anti-evergreening'
provisions, designed to prevent patent holders from
manipulating the court system to lengthen the term of the
patent and delay the entry of generic pharmaceuticals into
the market. They are a strong statement of Australia's
'legitimate expectations' of benefit (freedom from phar-
maceutical price rises due to 'evergreening') in this area.
They will be particularly important in countering claims
(based on Annex 2C.1 of the AUSFTA) that in implement-
ing this pharmaceutical policy Australia has not been ade-
quately 'valuing innovation.' This provision is a
'constructive ambiguity' as the Parties failed to conclu-
sively define the term 'innovation', or to agree on a con-
clusive mechanism for its determination. The Australian
negotiators favoured valuing pharmaceutical innvovation
through 'objectively demonstrated therapeutic signifi-
cance' under mechanisms such as PBS cost-effectivness
analysis and reference pricing once that has lead to a cost-
minimisation conclusion. Their US counterparts, on the
other hand, supported the valuing of innovation through
the operation of markets that are at least nominally 'com-
petitive'.
Ensuring that 'evergreening' does not impede rapid mar-
ket entry for generic medicines on brand name patent
expiry, represents a crucial underlying precondition to the
continuance of low prices in the PBS medicines cost-effec-
tiveness pricing system. Australian negotiators made clear
that existing mechanisms of evidence-based pharmac-
oeconomic analysis and reference pricing in a unitary for-
mulary were to be retained after the AUSFTA [29]. As
Australia's chief AUSFTA negotiator stated before the spe-
cial Senate roundtable on the PBS and the AUSFTA:
We are not importing the Hatch-Waxman legislation
into Australian law as a result of the free trade agree-
ment... [Article 17.10.4] will not extend the time of the
marketing approval process, and it does not add or
provide any additional rights to the patent holders in
that process...there is no injunction that can be
applied under this article...it will be clear in the legis-
lation tomorrow....we are establishing a measure in
the marketing approval process that will fully meet the
commitments under this article [30].
The US, nevertheless, has expressly signalled their disap-
proval of Australia's implementation of article 17.10.4 in
an exchange of letters between the Australian Minister for
Trade and the US Trade Representative on the implemen-
tation of the AUSFTA, in which the USTR stated:
If Australia's law is not sufficient to prevent the mar-
keting of a product, or a product for an approved use,
where the produce or use is covered by a patent, Aus-
tralia will have acted inconsistently with the Agree-Page 5 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2007, 4:8 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/4/1/8ment. We will be monitoring the matter closely, and
reserve all rights and remedies as discussed below.
We also remain concerned about recent amendments
to sections 26B(1)(a), 26C and 26D of the Therapeutic
Goods Act of 1989. Under these amendments, phar-
maceutical patents owners risk incurring significant
penalties when they seek to enforce their patent rights.
These provisions impose a potentially significant,
unjustifiable, and discrimintory burden on the enjoy-
ment of patent rights, specifically on owners of phar-
maceutical patents. I urge the Australian Government
to review this matter, particularly in light of Australia's
international legal obligations. The United States
reserves its rights to challenge the consistency of these
amendments with such obligations [31].
The US has achieved a similar provision to article 17.10.4
of the AUSFTA in article 18.9.4 of the Korean-United
States Free Trade Agreement (KORUSFTA). Article 18.9.4
of the KORUSFTA provides:
Where a Party permits, as a condition of approving the
marketing of a pharmaceutical product, persons, other
than the person originally submitting safety or efficacy
information, to rely on that information or on evi-
dence of safety or efficacy information of a product
that was previously approved, such as evidence of
prior marketing approval in the territory of the Party
or in another territory, that Party shall:
(a) provide that the patent owner shall be notified
of the identity of any such other person that
requests marketing approval to enter the market
during the term of a patent notified to the approv-
ing authority as covering that product or its
approved method of use; and
(b) implement measures in its marketing approval
process to prevent such other persons from mar-
keting a product without the consent or acquies-
cence of the patent owner during the term of a
patent notified to the approving authority as cov-
ering that product or its approved method of use
[32].
The significant advance (in terms of facilitating rapid and
plentiful generic market entry) of article 18.9.4 of the
KORUSFTA over article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA, is that for
the notification process to commence the patent holder
must first have notified the safety and efficacy regulator.
This facilitates the creation of a specific list of approved
pharmaceutical patents, notification not being required to
the owner of nay patents on the list. It also encourages cre-
ation of a regulatory oversight agency capable of winnow-
ing out mere 'me-too' pseudo or 'evergreening'-patents.
To Canadians observing these developments there must
have been a significant element of déjà vu. In 1993, as
mentioned, NAFTA had required the Canadians to imple-
ment a similar process.
Lessons from Canada's and Australia's Response 
to 'Linkage' Evergreening
Canada appears to have benefited from directly confront-
ing the threat of 'linkage evergreening' and implementing
regulatory processes designed to minimize it. Australian
authorities, on the other hand, are reluctant to admit that
pharmaceutical 'linkage evergreening' exists, possibly
because of the embarrassment such recognition might
cause in relation to the way they may have conducted the
AUSFTA negotiating process on such issues. Medicines
Australia, the Australian brand name pharmaceutical
industry lobbying body, has denied that 'evergreening'
occurs in Australia.
Evergreening is a foreign practice with no relevance in
Australia. It will not be allowed to occur in Australia
due to our intellectual property laws and because friv-
olous patents fail by definition [33].
Such ebullient statements are characteristic of the 'spin'
issuing from this patent pharmaceutical industry lobby
group. They studiously neglect to discuss any similarities
between the terms and purposes of article 17.10.4 of the
AUSFTA, and the US and Canadian 'linkage' evergreening'
provisions, as well as the regulatory and public health
problems which result.
In Canada, the Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison
under Health Canada has become an important regula-
tory mechanism for policing 'linkage' evergreening. No
attempt has been made to create a similar multidiscipli-
nary regulatory agency in Australia. Yet, it appears that
article 18.9.4 of the KORUSFTA has been specifically
drafted to permit the establishment of such a pharmaceu-
tical patent 'anti-evergreening' oversight agency.
In Canada, brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers
have become increasingly concerned that while the NOC
regulations could provide the "basis for effective protec-
tion of pharmaceutical patent owners' rights as required
under TRIPS and NAFTA. . . experience suggests that
Health Canada is taking steps to avoid the necessary appli-
cation of the regulations." [34]. Among other things, the
US Pharmaceutical Research and Development Associa-
tion (PhRMA) claims that Health Canada has been incon-
sistent in its policies and practices relating to the listing
and delisting of brand name companies' patents and inPage 6 of 11
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that Health Canada is continually and systematically lim-
iting further the types of patents that can be listed on the
Patent Register, that Canadian courts fail to provide effec-
tive recourse in cases where an NOC is issued for an
infringing generic medicine and that, ultimately, Cana-
dian courts are not applying standards required of them
under NAFTA and TRIPS. PhRMA's ultimate conclusion is
that the "USTR should attach high priority to remedying
this situation."
Canada's compliance with its related TRIPS and NAFTA
obligations remains a problem for PhRMA. Although
Canada has instituted statutory data protection, several
judicial rulings have cast doubt on enforcement, as
required by TRIPS Article 39.3 and NAFTA Article 1711
[35]. The Canadian government appears to have buckled
industry criticism of its inadequate so-called 'TRIPs-Plus'
['TRIPS-minus' from a public health point of view] protec-
tion of data exclusivity. This fails to understand that pat-
ents are really an intellectual monopoly privilege granted
in return for community access to data. Data exclusivity
prevents data submitted as part of the drug regulatory
approval process from being made available to generic
competitors to facilitate 'springboarding' or early market
entry on patent expiry. At the same time that the Canadian
government moved to limit the use of follow-on patents
by the brand-name patented pharmaceutical companies,
it also granted them an 8 year period of data exclusivity
[36].
In fact, data exclusivity provisions, permitting periods of
protection potentially cumulating for multiple uses and
potentially blocking even compulsory licenses, appears to
have dangerous (in terms of access to essential medicines)
synergies with 'linkage evergreening' structures. One les-
son here may be that regulatory data exclusivity be limited
to pharmaceuticals that have been assessed by experts to
be truly innovative, be restricted from cumulative applica-
tions and be prohibited from 'evergreening' an otherwise
expired patent term.
Canada's experience is another piece of evidence that a
trade dispute with the US over 'linkage evergreening'
requirements remains a strong possibility in Australia.
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, as earlier men-
tioned, in his exchange of letters with Trade Minister Vaile
expressly reserved the right of the U.S. to call into question
Australia's linkage and anti- evergreening amendments to
the TGA Act [37].
In the concluding paragraphs of this letter the U.S. Trade
Representative stated:
bringing the Agreement into effect is without preju-
dice to any future action the US Government may take
regarding compliance of Australia's laws and other
measures with the Agreement ... [i]f subsequent prac-
tice reveals problems with the full exercise of US rights
I have discussed above, Australia should expect that
we will take appropriate remedial action.
Indeed late in 2005 the US Ambassador flagged that if a
practical problem did emerge in the operation of these
anti-evergreening provisions, which the countries had
temporarily 'agreed to disagree' on, then the U.S. would
first approach Australia for a bilateral resolution, but fail-
ing that would litigate the matter before the WTO [38]. It
is unlikely because of the entrenched industry interests
involved, that such a dispute will be resolved at the con-
sultation stage. It is also unlikely that the US would use
the AUSFTA choice of forum provision (article 21.4) to
use a WTO panel before which its chances would be less
strong. The issue could become critical for Australia if it
passes legislation (National Health Amendment (Pharma-
ceutical Benefits Scheme) Bill 2007 (Cth)) fracturing its uni-
tary PBS formulary into an F1 category (for patented
medicines) and an F2 class (for generic medicines subject
to mandatory price reductions). With reduced profit mar-
gins in a low volume market, generic companies in Aus-
tralia (likely to be mostly subsidiaries of foreign firms-
witness the recent takeover of Alphapharm by US Mylan
Laboratories) will be in reduced position to challenge
evergreening claims, contribute to significantly reduced
public expenditure on medicines, or to take up the
national interest challenge of compulsory licensing in
public health emergencies.
A brief examination of the dispute resolution experience
under NAFTA suggests that any process of appointing
AUSFTA panel members can be protracted and susceptible
to diplomatic pressure [39]. The AUSFTA provisions
regarding the appointment of panel members resemble
but are not identical to those found in the NAFTA and the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO
[40]. Under the WTO DSU panelists are usually non-Party
members of WTO delegations or academics and are also
not nationals of the Parties unless by specific agreement
[41]. They are generally expected to have expertise rele-
vant to to the dispute [42]. In the ten years between the
ratification of NAFTA in 1993 and 2003, the NAFTA coun-
tries were unable to fully agree on the roster of pre-
approved panellists [43]. In the first two disputes to
require the establishment of a panel under the NAFTA, the
process of selecting a panel chair took six months [44].
Law professors seem to dominate amongst persons cho-
sen to be NAFTA panelists [45].Page 7 of 11
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slightly better than Canada for a potential trade dispute
over the 'linkage evergreening' provisions. Amongst the
AUSFTA-provoked amendments to the Australian Thera-
peutic Goods Act 1989 were provisions (the new ss26C and
26D) allowing, amongst other things, the Australian Fed-
eral Attorney-General to join an application for an injunc-
tion by a brand name patent holder against a generic
medicines manufacturer and to claim damages where the
injunction has caused a price rise under the Pharmaceuti-
cal Benefits Scheme (PBS). They may result in more scru-
tiny being applied by a patentee to the merits of its case,
in particular in relation to which of its claims it will seek
remedies for.
The Australian 'anti-evergreening' legislation may best be
viewed as analogous to a unilateral interpretive declara-
tion (something reasonably common in US bilateral trea-
ties as a result of US Senate oversight). It sets out
Australia's legitimate expectations that the benefit of US
acceptance that the fundamental architecture of the PBS
cost-effectiveness system (scientific evaluation of pharma-
ceutical innovation in terms of community benefit)
would not be affected and that no 'linkage evergreening'
system would be imported into Australia (to raise medi-
cines patent rents or prices) via article 17.10.4 of the AUS-
FTA.
The [Australian] Government's agreement to increased
transparency and a review process is consistent with
current PBS legislation. No change is required to that
legislation to effect our commitment to the US under
this agreement [46].
The Government of Australia retains the right and
authority to set the prices of medicine under the PBS.
The provisions of the pharmaceutical annex to the
Agreement will help improve market access for phar-
maceuticals in Australia by improving the transpar-
ency and accountability of Australia's PBS system [47].
We have negotiated an outcome in 17.10.4 and in
other areas of the agreement that will not lead to the
delay of generic medicines into this country...We are
not importing the Hatch-Waxman legislation into
Australian law as a result of the free trade agreement
[48].
Both the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Man-
ufacturing Associations and the US PhRMA have report-
edly commented that their view is that these provisions
are inconsistent with obligations under TRIPS article 27
prohibiting discrimination in an area of technology
(pharmaceuticals) [49]. The US is likely to argue, in this
context, that the Australian anti-'linkage evergreening' leg-
islation affects only pharmaceutical patents and is there-
fore discriminatory. Australia, on the other hand, could
argue that where a unique problem arises specifically ref-
erable only to a particular field of technology, a solution
applying sui generis only to that field of technology cannot
be said to be discriminatory. This definition of discrimi-
nation is in accordance with the ordinary meaning and
purpose of the TRIPs agreement.
In the Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
case, for example, Australia argued that discrimination in
relation to enjoyment of patent rights should be distin-
guished from the application of uniform rules in all areas
of technology. Further, Australia argued that it was not
inconsistent with TRIPS to provide for distinct patent
rules that responded to practical consequences of differ-
ences between fields of technology [50]. An illustration of
this point is the obligations of disclosure for inventions
which are micro-organisms, in which inventors must
deposit a sample of the micro-organisms in accordance
with the Budapest Convention. This method of disclosure
is unique to inventors of micro-organisms, but it is not
discriminatory because the issue only arises with respect
to micro-organisms.
In fact, there are a number of obligations imposed by the
AUSFTA that relate to the enjoyment of patent rights for
pharmaceuticals alone, including extension of the terms
of a pharmaceutical patent to compensate the patent
owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent
term as a result of the marketing approval process
(17.9.8(b)). This is clearly not discriminatory because the
issue of delays in enjoyment of patent rights due to the
marketing approval process arises only in the context of
pharmaceutical patents.
To hold that sections 26C and 26D are discriminatory as
to the field of technology would necessitate finding that
the whole of Chapter 6, Part 3 of the Patents Act 1990
(Cth) dealing with extensions of patent terms for pharma-
ceutical patents is also discriminatory and in breach of
Australia's TRIPs obligations. The simplistic definition of
discrimination that gives rise to such a result cannot be
said to in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the
term, in light of the object and purpose of the TRIPs agree-
ment, or the AUSFTA under article 21.9.2 (incorporating
articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT). There could be many
important lessons here for other nations dealing with
'linkage' 'evergreening' imposed through trade agree-
ments
One particular area of interest in any such 'linkage ever-
greening' trade dispute would be the role of non violation
nullification of benefits (NVNB) remedies. Article 21.2(c)
of the AUSFTA, for example, provides that the dispute set-Page 8 of 11
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where a Party considers that:
[A] benefit the Party could reasonably have expected
to accrue to it under Chapters Two (National Treat-
ment and Market Access for Goods [including Annex
2C]...or Seventeen (Intellectual Property Rights)
[which includes article 17.10.4] is being nullified or
impaired as a result of a measure that is not inconsist-
ent with this Agreement.
This type of NVNB claim has thus rightly been considered
an 'exceptional remedy,' closely restricted to upholding
concessions made during negotiations, and one that
should be approached with 'extreme caution' [51]. This is
reflected in the fact that there have been less than ten dis-
putes in the history of the GATT and WTO involving
NVNB claims. The exceptional nature of the NVNB claim
is also highlighted by Article 26 of the DSU which pro-
vides that the complaining party carry the burden of pro-
viding a "detailed" justification in support of its
complaint [52].
NVNB claims aim to ensure the obligation to act in good
faith, with a particular duty of 'transparency and open-
ness,' applies to the negotiating process, as Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
(incorporated in the AUSFTA via article 21.9.2) do with
respect to the implementation of the text of a treaty [53].
In NVNB disputes, the inquiry to be made by a dispute
resolution panel is whether the complaining party was
induced into error by the other treaty Party about a fact or
situation that the former could not reasonably have fore-
seen [54].
The GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels have iden-
tified certain key elements that an NVNB complainant
must establish in order to gain relief: (1) the application
of a measure by a party; (2) a benefit was reasonably
expected to accrue under the agreement or as a result of a
fact or situation represented by a party during negotia-
tions; (3) nullification or impairment of that benefit as a
result of the application of the measure; (4) the nullifica-
tion or impairment could not reasonably have been
expected at the time of the agreement.
A necessary fifth element, however, is that the NVNB
claim must specify breach of a clearly defined treaty obli-
gation, rather than breach of a constructive ambiguity.
Constructive ambiguities are the textual manifestations of
negotiating truces. They are inherently ill-defined and of
uncertain scope and application: an obvious example
being valuing of pharmaceutical 'innovation' in Annex
2C.1 of the AUSFTA, where Australian and the US negoti-
ators inserted competing definitions. Any panel failing to
give adequate respect to the principle that NVNB claims
presumptively only apply to manifestly explicit obliga-
tions, would be countenancing indefinitely protracted
negotiations with destabilizing unpredictability and break
down of good faith in interpretation of international trade
obligations.
Conclusion
The Canadian NOC linkage regulations are an ongoing
source of controversy not only domestically in Canada
between the generic and brand name sectors of the phar-
maceutical industry, but also between the US pharmaceu-
tical industry and the Canadian government. In financial
terms, if the generic industry is to be believed, these brand
name pharmaceutical industry-sponsored, 'pro-evergreen-
ing' regulations have probably added hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars to the Canadian drug bill since 1993 when
they were first put into place and may be partly responsi-
ble for the increase in co-payments and deductibles in
publicly funded provincial drug plans. Furthermore, if the
dispute around their enforcement between Canada and
the US continues to escalate there is the potential lead for
the US to impose trade sanctions against Canada. Canada
has to some extent ameliorated the impact of these regu-
lations through the supervision of a dedicated patented
list by the Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison.
Despite multinational pharmaceutical industry protesta-
tions to the contrary, article 17.10.4 of the AUSFTA is
probably intended, and is likely, to pose similar 'ever-
greening' problems to Australia. Pharmaceutical policy
reforms since the AUSFTA (as the result of strong lobbying
by Medicines Australia) have been almost uniformly to
the detriment of generics manufacturers and to the benefit
of brand name companies, despite the total dominance of
foreign interests in the latter camp. Vigorous enforcement
of the anti-evergreening legislation in Australia, though
entirely justifiable under both TRIPS and the AUSFTA,
may lead to US threats of trade retaliation. The issue for
Australian officials may be whether they have the nerve to
call the US bluff (over how to value innovation and what
were the parties respective legitimate expectations) and
initiate dispute resolution procedures in a WTO forum,
before less favorable AUSFTA mechanisms are invoked.
One of the most important lessons for Australia from the
Canadian experience with 'linkage' evergreening may be
the need to create a multidisciplinary regulatory oversight
body such as the Office of Patented Medicines and Liai-
son. The Koreans seem to be heading in this direction.
Another may be the importance of not being backward in
preparing for and initiating WTO dispute resolution pro-
ceedings over related pharmaceutical policy issues. If the
New Zealand government manages to 'carve out' 'linkage
evergreening' from its TGA-inherited Trans-Tasman Ther-Page 9 of 11
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have created a reason for generic firms to relocate in that
nation. The recent mooted agreement over 'fast track'
trade agreement approvals between the US Trade Repre-
sentative and US Democrats may see 'linkage evergreen-
ing' scrapped from future US bilateral trade agreement
negotiations. Whether this will lead to a reconsideration
of its place in the KORUSFTA and AUSFTA remains to be
seen, but is devoutly to be wished by all interested in sus-
tainable industry profits linked to improved public health
outcomes.
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